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Abstract—A (computational) client puzzle scheme en-
ables a client to prove to a server that a certain amount
of computing resources (CPU cycles and/or Memory look-
ups) has been dedicated to solve a puzzle. In a num-
ber of different scenarios, researchers have applied client
puzzle schemes to mitigate DoS attacks. In this paper,
we introduce two batch verification modes for the RSW
client puzzle scheme in order to improve the verification
efficiency for the server, and investigate three methods for
handling incorrect solutions in batch verifications.
I. Introduction
A (computational) client puzzle scheme enables a
client to prove to a server that a certain amount
of computing resources (CPU cycles and/or Memory
look-ups) has been dedicated to solve a puzzle. It has
been applied to mitigate denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
in a number of scenarios such as email systems, web
servers, and critical communication infrastructures. In
a DoS attack, an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate
users from accessing information or services by send-
ing a large number of fake requests; furthermore, in
its distributed form (referred to as a DDoS attack [9]),
an attacker may use the controlled Zombie computers
to simultaneously launch the attack. In more details,
there are two categories of DoS attacks.
• One is the exhaustion of specific types of very
limited computer resources, such as TCP connec-
tions. For example, the SYN flood attack falls into
this category [6]. With a client puzzle scheme
implemented, the server can mitigate an attack
by asking every client to solve a puzzle before
allocating any resource. The rationale is that, the
number of “valid” requests from a malicious client
will drop to some extent because the client has
only limited resources to find puzzle solutions.
• The other is the exhaustion of bandwidth or gen-
eral CPU cycles or memory usages, for this pur-
pose, the adversary just congests the communica-
tion links or sends nonsense messages to the vic-
tim. For example, the jamming attack in wireless
sensor networks falls into this category [7]. With
a client puzzle scheme implemented, if malicious
clients send non-sense data as their puzzle solu-
tions, the attack will become even worse because
the server has to spend resources in verifying
the fake puzzle solutions. Therefore, client puzzle
schemes will not help here.
In this paper, we focus on using client puzzle schemes
to mitigate the first category of Dos attacks. How to
mitigate the second type of DoS attacks is beyond the
scope of this paper. For the related work in using client
puzzles to combat DoS attacks, refer to [10] or the full
version of this paper.
To effectively mitigate DoS attacks, the deterministic
computation and parallel computation resistance prop-
erties, formally defined in [10], are desirable for a client
puzzle scheme. The deterministic computation prop-
erty implies that the server can precisely determine the
required resource required from the client in solving a
puzzle. Without this property, the server never knows
what is the exact amount of computation required from
a client to solve a puzzle, and therefore is unable
to set an appropriate hardness for the puzzle. The
parallel computation resistance property implies that
the client cannot accelerate the puzzle solving process
by letting more than one computer work in parallel.
In practice, it is very difficult for a server to deter-
mine the amount of computing resources a client can
access, especially in the presence of malicious clients
which control a large number of Zombie computers.
To some extent, this property will eliminate the com-
putation disparity between clients and help create a
fair situation for them. It is worth noting the memory-
bound client puzzles [1], [4], [5] also aim at eliminating
such disparity, however, they have not been proven
with the parallel computation resistance property. Most
existing client puzzle schemes, such those based on
hash functions [3], [6], do not achieve these properties.
Interestingly, the RSW scheme, which was originally
proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner to realize
timed-encryption, achieves both properties [10]. To our
knowledge, this is the only scheme that has been
rigorously proven achieving both properties.
The downside with the RSW scheme is that it incurs
heavy overhead for the server, which needs to perform
one exponentiation to verify a puzzle solution. In
this paper, we first investigate how to improve the
efficiency of the server by verifying multiple puz-
zle solutions. We apply the batch verification tech-
niques, which were originally introduced for signature
schemes [2], to the RSW scheme, and introduce two
batch verification modes. The application is rather
straightforward and our contribution lies in the han-
dling of incorrect solutions in the batch verification
process. To this end, we propose three methods for
handling incorrect solutions in batch verifications, and
provide comparison results based on our simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce two batch verification modes
for the RSW scheme. In Section III, we introduce
three methods to handle incorrect solutions in batch
verifications. In Section IV, we conclude the paper.
II. Batch Verification of the RSW Scheme
The scheme, described below, is a slightly modified
version of the original RSW client puzzle scheme pro-
posed by Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner [8]. For simplic-
ity, we still call it the RSW scheme.
• Setup(`): Run by the server, this algorithm takes
a security parameter ` as input. It selects two
random large primes p, q and a hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗pq, and outputs the public parameter
pq and the master key mk = (p, q).
• PuzzleGen(mk, d, req): Run by the server, this algo-
rithm takes the server’s master key mk, a puzzle
hardness d, and some additional information req as
input, and computes g = H(r||req) where r ∈R Z∗pq.
The server sends puz = (g, d) to the client as the
puzzle, while keeps the related puzzle information
in f o = (r, d, req) by itself.
• PuzzleSol(puz): Run by a client, this algorithm
takes a puzzle puz as input and outputs sol = g2
d
mod pq.
• PuzzleVer(mk, in f o, sol): Run by the server, this al-
gorithm takes the master key mk, the related puz-
zle information in f o, and the puzzle solution sol
as input. It returns 1 if sol ≡ g2
d mod φ(pq) (mod pq),
where g = H(r||req), and returns 0 otherwise.
Note that the puzzle hardness parameter d is an inte-
ger, denoting the number of multiplications in Z∗pq.
In the above scheme, g is computed as g = H(r||req),
while g is randomly chosen from Z∗pq in [8]. In our
case, if needed, the g can be bound to situational
information (such as the identity information of the
client) contained in req. With respect to computing the
verification complexity of the server, we omit that of
computing 2d mod φ(pq) for two reasons. One is that
it could be pre-computed and stored by the server.
The other is that, in many cases, multiple puzzles
might share the same hardness so that the computation
only needs to be done once. As a consequence, it is
straightforward to calculate that the average verifica-
tion complexity for the server is 3L2 − 2 multiplications
in Z∗pq, where L is the bit-length of φ(pq).
This scheme has been proven with the deterministic
computation and parallel computation resistance prop-
erties [10], and we skip the details here. In the rest of
this section, we introduce two batch verification modes
for the RSW scheme. Due to the lack of space, the
proofs for all lemmas will appear in a full version of
this paper.
A. A Batch Verification Mode - Attempt
As to the multiplication operation in Z∗pq, given that,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai ∈ Z
∗
pq and bi = a
r
i
mod pq for r ∈ N,
the following equality holds.
(
n∏
i=1
ai)
r ≡
n∏
i=1
bi (mod pq)
Based on this observation, suppose that there are n
puzzles puzi = (gi, d) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and solutions hi
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), we can verify the solutions using a batch
verification mode, by checking the following equality.
(
n∏
i=1
gi)
2d mod φ(pq) ≡
n∏
i=1
hi (mod pq) (1)
Note that we assume the puzzles share the same
hardness granularity d.
Let L be the bit-length of φ(pq). The average batch
verification complexity is Cn =
3L
2 + 2n − 4 multipli-
cations in Z∗pq. If the server sequentially verifies the
individual puzzle solutions, the complexity would be
( 3L2 − 2) · n. With reasonable parameters (say, L = 1024
and n = 100), the batch verification is much more
efficient, namely
Cn = 1732 << (
3L
2
− 2) · n = 153400.
With respect to this batch verification mode, we have
the following observations.
1) If the equality (1) does not hold, then at least
one solution is incorrect, i.e. h j , g
r
j
(mod pq) for
some 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
2) If all solutions are correct, i.e. hi ≡ g
r
i
(mod pq)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then the equality (1) holds.
3) If the equality (1) holds, it does not imply that all
solutions are correct. Clearly, if hi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are
replaced with any h′
i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), where
n∏
i=1
hi ≡
n∏
i=1
h′i (mod pq),
the equality still holds.
The third observation implies that there could be
false accept if the server verifies the solutions simply
by checking the equality (1). In fact, the client(s) only
needs to perform d repeated squarings to compute H,
where
H = (
n∏
i=1
gi)
2d (mod pq),
then it can split H into h′
i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) as the solutions.
B. A Batch Verification Mode - Improvement
Suppose that there are n puzzles puzi = (gi, d) (1 ≤
i ≤ n) and solutions hi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the improved batch
verification mode is as follows. Select xi ∈ Z
∗
N
, where
N is an integer and smaller than pq, and check the
following equality.
(
n∏
i=1
(gi)
xi)2
d mod φ(pq) ?≡
n∏
i=1
(hi)
xi (mod pq) (2)
Let L be the bit-length of φ(pq). The average batch
verification complexity is 3L2 + 2n − 4 + 2n · (
3L′
2 − 2)
multiplications in Z∗pq, where L
′ is the bit-length of N.
With respect to this batch verification mode, the first
and second observations in the previous subsection are
still true. The third observation is also partially true,
but the false accept probability can be reduced as low
as possible by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If the equality (2) holds, the probability that
there exist incorrect solutions (i.e. h j , g
r
j
(mod pq) holds
for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n) is upper-bounded by 1N .
C. Further Improvement
Orthogonal to the improvement in Section II-B, the
false accept shortcoming may be mitigated by the fol-
lowing divide-and-verify strategy. Suppose that a dis-
honest client tries to use the following trick to cheat
the server.
Attack assumption. As noted in Section II-A, the
client generates H = (
∏n
i=1 gi)
2d (mod pq) first, and
then randomly splits it into n individual solutions h′
i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n)).
With the divide-and-verify strategy, after receiving a
certain number of puzzle solutions, the server first
divides the received puzzle solutions (which may be
from other clients) into several subgroups, and then
performs batch verification in each subgroup. With this
strategy, the probability of false accept is determined by
the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the server divides the received
solutions into Y subgroups. The probability that a false
accept occurs is ( 1Y )
n−1.
Clearly, when Y becomes larger (or, the size of sub-
group become smaller), the false accept rate will drop
much faster. In practice, the divide-and-verify strategy
and the improved batch verification mode (described
in Section II-B) can be integrated, namely the server
first divides the received puzzle solutions into several
subgroups, and then performs batch verification for
each subgroup. The false accept rate is described by the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the server divides the received solu-
tions into Y subgroups. With the improved batch verification
mode, the probability that a false accept occur is ( 1Y )
n−1 · 1N .
III. Handling Incorrect Solutions in Batch
Verification
With the batch verification modes described in Sec-
tion II, incorrect solutions in the batch (referred to as
B = (h1, h2, · · · , hn), will be detected when the following
inequalities hold, respectively.
(
n∏
i=1
gi)
2d mod φ(pq)
,
n∏
i=1
hi (mod pq), or
(
n∏
i=1
(gi)
xi)2
d mod φ(pq)
,
n∏
i=1
(hi)
xi (mod pq)
Roughly, the server can deal with an erroneous batch
in two ways. One solution is to treat all puzzle so-
lutions to be incorrect and reject them. This could be
a reasonable solution when combined with reputation
systems in some application scenarios. However, gen-
erally, it is not a good choice because an adversary can
pollute (multiple) puzzle batches by sending incorrect
solutions to the server and make the server reject the
puzzle solutions from legitimate clients. An alternative
solution is for the server to sort out the incorrect
solutions and reject them. Furthermore, the server may
also enforce other punishment on the client(s) which
have sent them.
Next, we take the basic verification mode as ex-
ample and consider three different methods to figure
out the incorrect solutions, namely sequential searching,
sequential searching with batch verification, and dividing-
and-conquering. Our analysis will focus on the average
complexity for the server.
A. The Case of sequential searching
The strategy of sequential searching is straightforward:
if incorrect solutions are detected, the server verifies
each puzzle solution in the batch and finds out all the
incorrect ones. Clearly, the complexity is n · ( 3L2 − 2)
multiplications in Z∗pq.
B. The Case of sequential searching with batch verifi-
cation
Choose i as an index and initialize it to be 1, then the
algorithm of sequential searching with batch verification
works as follows.
1) Verify the solution hi.
a) If the verification passes, set i = i + 1, re-
execute this step if i ≤ n and stop otherwise.
b) Otherwise, hi is incorrect, set i = i+1. If i > n,
stop; otherwise, go to step 2.
2) Verify the puzzle solutions h j (i ≤ j ≤ n) using the
batch verification mode. If the verification passes,
stop; otherwise, go to step 1.
Suppose that there are 1 ≤ t ≤ n incorrect solutions
which are uniformly distributed in the batch. With
respect to the computations in the above two steps,
we have the following observations.
• In step 1, the server needs to perform puzzle
verification on individual puzzle solutions. Let the
average complexity be U¯, which is determined by
the average of the distribution of the highest index
z of the incorrect solutions in the batch. Note that
we suppose there are t errors in the batch, the
average complexity is as follows.
U¯ = (
3L
2
− 2) ·
n∑
z=t
(z · Pz), Pz =
t
z
·
n−z−1∏
i=0
n − t − i
n − i
• In step 2, the server needs to perform batch ver-
ification if h j is incorrect, and the complexity is
3L
2 − 4 + 2(n − j). Note that n − j the distance from
h j to hn. For 1 ≤ k ≤
t
2 , the following two averages
are the same: the average of the distance l from k-
th incorrect solution to h1, and the average of the
distance l′ from (t−k+1)-th incorrect solution to hn.
Based on the remark in Section II-A, the average
complexity of batch verifications following these
two incorrect solutions is
2(
3L
2
− 4) + 2(n − l + l′ − 1) = 3L + 2n − 10.
As a result, the average complexity of batch veri-
fications is V¯, where
V¯ =
t
2
· (3L + 2n − 10).
In summary, the complexity of the whole process is
U¯ + V¯.
C. The Case of dividing-and-conquering
Generate a puzzle set list L and initialize it to be {B}.
The algorithm of dividing-and-conquering is as follows.
1) If the list L is empty, stop. Otherwise, pick up
the first puzzle set in the list, and go to Step 2.
2) Equally split the chosen puzzle set into two sub-
sets, and verify one of them (randomly chosen)
first using the basic batch verification mode. Note
that, if the number of solutions in the set is
odd, then it can allow one subset has one more
member than the other subset. Based on the
verification result, do the following.
• If the verification passes, do the following.
If the size of the other subset is larger than
1, then adds it to the list L and go to Step
1. Otherwise, output the other subset as an
incorrect puzzle solution and go to Step 1.
• If the verification fails, do the following. If the
size of this subset is larger than 1, then add it
to the list L, otherwise output this subset as
an incorrect puzzle solution. Verify the other
subset and do the following.
– If the verification passes, go to Step 1.
– If the verification fails, do the following: If
the size of the other subset is larger than
1, then add it to the list L and go to Step
1. Otherwise, output the other subset as an
incorrect puzzle solution and go to Step 1.
D. A Comparison of Different Methods
As to the methods sequential searching and sequential
searching with batch verification, we have figured out
the formulas for the verification complexities. In order
to evaluate the complexity of the method dividing-
and-conquering, we run a Mathematica program 100
times to compute the average with respect to randomly
chosen distributions of the t incorrect puzzle solutions.
To compare the performances of different methods,
we choose two cases with the batch sizes of 128 and
1024. In each case, we consider the subcases where
there are 2, 10, and 50 incorrect solutions respectively.
The results are summarized in Table I.
From Table I, we can roughly draw the follow-
ing conclusions. When the rate of incorrect solutions
(namely tn ) is small, the method dividing-and-conquering
is more efficient than the other two, and the method
sequential searching with batch verification is also more
efficient than the method sequential searching. When the
rate increases, the advantage of the method dividing-
and-conquering becomes less obvious, while sequential
searching with batch verification may become less effi-
cient than the method sequential searching. Intuitively,
let the bit-length of φ(pq) be 1024 (i.e. L = 1024), a
Figure 1. Comparison Results
(n, t) Searching Number
Method of Multiplications
(128,2)
sequential searching (SS) -256+192L
SS with batch verification 74+132L
dividing-and-conquering 431+26L
(128,10)
sequential searching (SS) -256+192L
SS with batch verification 995+191L
dividing-and-conquering 652+72L
(128,50)
sequential searching (SS) -256+192L
SS with batch verification 5897 +257L
dividing-and-conquering 795+200L
(1024,2)
sequential searching (SS) -2048+1536L
SS with batch verification 671+1028L
dividing-and-conquering 3879 + 39L
(1024,10)
sequential searching (SS) -2048+1536L
SS with batch verification 8326+1413L
dividing-and-conquering 6593+128L
(1024,50)
sequential searching (SS) -2048+1536L
SS with batch verification 48940+1582L
dividing-and-conquering 9208+374L
Table I
Complexity Comparison
visual comparison is shown in Figure 1. Overall, the
method dividing-and-conquering is a preferred one.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the RSW scheme
supports batch verification modes, which greatly im-
prove the efficiency for the server. While our proposal
is theoretical and abstract at the moment, an interesting
future work is to instantiate the proposal in a real-
world application, such as defeating junk emails, and
to further investigate the effectiveness.
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